Le 15 février dernier marquait le 20ème anniversaire du retrait soviétique d’Afghanistan. A tort ou à raison, le conflit actuel est souvent comparé à l’expérience de l’URSS dans les années 1980. Une telle comparaison est par essence teintée de pessimisme, et sert généralement à soutenir la thèse d’un retrait urgent des troupes otaniennes d’Asie du sud, sous prétexte qu’aucune forme de succès ne peut être atteinte et que l’échec est inévitable. Pourtant, s’il est intéressant de souligner les points communs entre les deux opérations en Afghanistan, afin d’apprendre des erreurs du passé, il est tout aussi primordial d’insister sur les différences qui peuvent laisser entrevoir une (légère) touche d’optimisme.
Au rayon des comparaisons, on notera que l’URSS considérait dès 1985, comme les Etats-Unis aujourd’hui, que les objectifs initiaux ne pourraient jamais être atteints, que « le temps n’était pas de notre côté [soviétique] » pour citer Gromyko en 1986 (via les National Security Archives de la George Washington University), alors président du Soviet Suprême, et qu’un retrait s’imposait. Côté américain aujourd’hui, le rêve d’établir une démocratie occidentale à Kaboul s’est effacé, mais l’ambition d’installer un régime stable (quitte à négocier avec les Taliban « modérés ») et d’atteindre une certaine forme de « victoire » revue à la baisse demeure (plus de bannière « Mission Accomplished » cette fois-ci).
Le retrait soviétique planifié dès 1985 était empêché par la peur d’une retraite humiliante vis-à-vis de l’ennemi américain. Aujourd’hui, les Etats-Unis on également peur d’une retraite humiliante, mais davantage vis-à-vis d’al-Qaïda que de n’importe quelle autre puissance rivale.
En outre, les Soviétiques posaient comme condition préalable à leur retrait la mise en place d’un gouvernement stable, reposant sur un large soutien populaire, et disposant d’une armée et d’une police équipées pour faire face aux moudjaheddines. La similarité avec l’objectif annoncé de la mission des forces de la coalition en Afghanistan aujourd’hui est évidente. Mais cela ne veut pas dire pour autant que l’échec est inévitable.
Le point commun fondamental entre les deux expériences, comme le souligne Bruce Riedel dans le dernier numéro de CTC Sentinel, tient dans le rôle joué par le Pakistan. En effet, dans les deux cas, le Pakistan constitue la « zone de sécurité » (safe haven, en anglais) à partir de laquelle les insurgés opèrent et s’approvisionnent. Les Soviétiques n’avaient jamais réussi à convaincre le Pakistan (et donc les Américains) de mater l’insurrection (et pour cause : l’objectif américain était d’affaiblir l’URSS en finançant les insurgés via les services secrets pakistanais). Aujourd’hui, les Américains sont pris à leur propre piège : les connections qu’ils ont contribué à créer entre renseignements pakistanais et djihadistes et Taliban empêchent tout engagement crédible du Pakistan (lequel qui plus est table sur un retrait des Américains, et donc préfère garder une forme de contrôle sur l’Afghanistan).
L’autre point commun essentiel tient sans doute dans cette phrase de Gorbatchev, prononcée en novembre 1986 (toujours via les National Security Archives) : « Nos généraux n’apprennent pas leurs leçons. (…) Nous avons eu des expériences passées en Angola, en Ethiopie, au Mozambique. Il doit y avoir une courbe d’apprentissage. (…) Nous devons trouver les clés de cette guerre ». Le récent remplacement du général McKiernan en Afghanistan ne fait qu’illustrer ce même problème.
Malgré ces quelques similitudes, des différences majeures persistent qui laissent entrevoir une meilleure issue au conflit. Tout d’abord, la raison de l’intervention américaine (défense nationale, sécurité collective) est bien plus légitime que celle qui avait poussé l’invasion russe (installer un régime communiste, sécuriser la frontière sud). Résultat : la mission de l’Otan bénéficie d’un bien plus large soutien international que celle de l’URSS. En outre, cela offre une plus grande marge de manœuvre à la coalition. En effet, le type de régime mis en place importe peu (du moins en théorie) et seul compte désormais le besoin d’éviter de créer un nouveau havre de paix pour al-Qaïda ou d’autres organisations terroristes. Enfin, les opérations contre-insurrectionnelles soviétiques étaient extrêmement brutales et non adaptées à ce type de conflit asymétrique, ce qui rendait toute victoire impossible.
En conclusion, retenons qu’il y a au moins autant de différences que de similarités entre les expériences soviétiques et otaniennes en Afghanistan. Dès lors, il est erroné d’élaborer des comparaisons hâtives entre les deux conflits, même s’il est intéressant et important de tirer des enseignements des erreurs du passé pour ne pas les répéter. Une victoire reste possible en Afghanistan, même si cette victoire n’est en rien semblable à celle qui était espérée à la genèse du conflit.
Cet article est simultanément crossposté sur Alliance Geostratégique.
Image 1: Retrait soviétique d’Afghanistan. Crédit: Wikimedia Commons.
Image 2: Hélicoptères et tanks russes en Afghanistan. Crédit: Wikimedia Commons.
mardi 26 mai 2009
Les Soviétiques et l’Otan en Afghanistan: des différences qui importent
vendredi 22 mai 2009
Mise à Jour de la Blogoliste
On a le droit de prendre son temps, mais pas de manquer à sa tâche...donc, après une longue période injustifiable, j'ai enfin mis ma blogoliste à jour (désolé pour ceux que j'aurais encore oublié, c'est un processus continu, même si je ne vise pas à l'exhaustivité)...Les derniers ajoutés valaient cependant la peine d'être mentionnés pour la qualité de leur blog, et leur régularité éditoriale. Bravo à eux.
Vous trouverez donc, Géographie de la ville en guerre, tenu par l'excellente Bénédicte Tratnjek; Mon blog défense, fait par un consultant en défense; Soliloques, composé de très courtes réflexions stratégiques et philosophiques; Historicoblog (2), par Stéphane Mantoux; et enfin mes collègues de l'Alliance Géostratégique que j'avais honteusement (flagellez moi si nécessaire!) oubliés: Les Carnets de Clarisse; Nihil Novi Sub Sole; et Quindi.
PS: Il y avait également un changement d'adresse pour le blog Guérillas de Romain Lalane.
mardi 19 mai 2009
Surréalisme afghan
On a l'impression de vivre en plein surréalisme belge en Afghanistan: l'ancien ambassadeur américain d'origine afghane Zalmay Khalilzad serait proche de devenir le plus haut responsable politique (non élu) dans le gouvernement d'Hamid Karzai...on croit rêver (enfin, un mauvais rêve...): comment prétendre instaurer un gouvernement légitime, autonome, aux yeux de la population lorsque le n°2 du gouvernement représente si clairement l'"occupant"?
dimanche 17 mai 2009
Recrutement Jihadiste en Grande-Bretagne
Le Sunday Times se vante de révéler la première histoire "de l'intérieur" d'un récit d'un jeune jihadiste recruté à Londres. Je vous éviterai mes commentaires sur ces journalistes qui se vantent d'"exclusivité"...Mais je relèverai les points suivants.
Le jeune homme en question explique qu'il a été recruté dans une mosquée de Londres. Alors qu'il allait prier, un groupe de radicaux l'a approché subtilement et a commencé à lui parler des innocents qui étaient tués en Irak, etc. Après cette première prise de contact (sans doute plusieurs, en réalité), il a été invité à quelques cours "religieux", ensuite suivis de visionnages de films jihadistes. Plus le processus de radicalisation avançait, selon le jeune homme, moins il y avait de doutes sur l'orientation jihadiste des recruteurs. Plus tard, les recrues participaient aux premiers entraînements pratiques, c'est-à-dire du paintball dans la forêt par exemple, en Angleterre. Si les recrues passaient les tests et juraient allégeance, elles étaient envoyées au Pakistan pour le véritable entraînement au jihad, afin de revenir par après mener des opérations en Europe.
On notera de ce compte-rendu qu'il reflète parfaitement tout ce que l'on savait déjà du processus de recrutement. Mais surtout, cela réflète l'"ancien mode de recrutement". Par cela, j'entend, comme je l'ai déjà souligné par ailleurs, que l'Afghanistan a aujourd'hui remplacé l'Irak comme motif de recrutement, que l'internet a au moins égalé les mosquées comme lieu de recrutement, et que les cellules sont peut-être aussi plus diparses qu'avant.
jeudi 14 mai 2009
Pope: Recommendations pour Obama
Je recopie ci-dessous cet excellent texte de William P. Pope, ancien coordinateur pour le contre-terrorisme au Département de Sécurité Nationale américain, publié par Europe's World. Il s'agit de recommendations pour le Président Obama en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme. C'est selon moi un texte sobre (pas toujours le cas dans cette littérature) qui reprend bien un grand nombre des aspects de la lutte contre le terrorisme, malgré la longueur limitée de l'article. Ce sont en tout cas des recommendations que je partage en grande partie.
Confronting global terrorism: recommendations for the US president
Author : William P. Pope
As the President of the United States, you are tasked with confronting a world of unprecedented complexity. One of the most vexing problems, but only one of many, is global terrorism. It is at least a generational problem and likely more. While the Bush Administration did much right in the days after 9/11, it went seriously off track in Iraq, which diminished the effort in Afghanistan. Domestically, it undermined our civil liberties and took other wrong steps. For the sake of the country and the success of your administration, you must speak clearly and forthrightly to your fellow Americans and our friends abroad. You cannot be the “action officer” on every daily twist and turn of our counterterrorism efforts, but you set the moral direction and make the most important policy decisions. Therefore, you must have a broader world view and greater personal understanding of world history and the relationship of current events to that history and to each other. It is essential that you understand and respect other countries, societies and religions and not view them through ideology-tinged glasses or as Americans at a remove.
In making and leading US counterterrorism and homeland security policy, please keep a few key points in mind. They include:
Terrorism is not new: Terrorism did not just spring up, fully formed, on September 11, 2001. Secular terrorists hijacked an El Al airliner in 1968. We are also reminded of the massacre of the 1972 Israeli team in Munich. In Europe, there was a long struggle, not yet entirely won, against the Red Brigades, IRA, ETA and others. Numerous attacks against the US, from Beirut to New York to East Africa to Aden, pre-dated 9/11. Terrorism is not a 21st-century phenomenon.
Terrorism is not an existential threat to the US: Yes, Osama bin Laden hopes to acquire a nuclear weapon. He surely would use it, if he could. That said, remember that the Soviet missile threat was an existential one. Bin Laden and other murderers cannot destroy the United States and cannot undermine our way of life, unless we let fear do it for them.
Keep terrorism in perspective: Therefore, it is essential that your administration keeps terrorism in perspective. Combating terrorism is an essential duty, but you and your colleagues at the top of the government must set the example and be seen to be calm and resolute. Resist recommendations to stoke public emotion and fear, even if doing so might be of short-term political advantage. The US has confronted and defeated much worse. So have our allies. Even if al-Qaeda manages to set off a nuclear device in a US city, we must not again resort to counterproductive actions, such as widespread incarceration of Muslim-Americans; brusque treatment of our allies (“with us or against us”); glaring lack of understanding of other cultures; and questionable approach towards the very civil liberties our country stands for. Former CIA operative Glenn Carle wrote recently that “We must not delude ourselves about the nature of the terrorist threat to our country. We must not take fright at the specter that our leaders have exaggerated.” Carle is right. I suggest that you bring in balanced experts like Carle, as early as possible in your term, for a reality-check on the factual state of international terrorism and how to confront it.
Terrorism is a tactic, not an ideology: We need to prevent and mitigate terrorist acts while doing what is, in some ways, the more difficult thing - understanding who uses this tactic and why. Are terrorists really just “crazy dead-enders?” Kremlinologists studied the Soviet Union in order to understand better how to contain it. Now, we must understand terrorists and their motivations. Willful ignorance will not do. Many terrorists are well-educated and seemingly very normal, especially the leaders. Several experts, such as psychiatrists Jerrold Post and Marc Sageman, have done extensive studies of the terrorist mindset. Your administration should make a point of consulting such experts early and often.
We must be patient: The terrorists are. Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, wrote that “the Crusaders in Palestine and Syria left after two centuries of continued jihad.” While the FBI and others have worked hard, it may be that such patience on the part of the terrorists is why we have not been struck again. Al-Qaeda waited eight years between the first World Trade Center attack and 9/11. The struggle against terrorism will be generational. The previous administration pledged to carry on the global fight against terrorism until “victory” and until the terrorists were “defeated.” Many people think of “victory” as the signing of a surrender document on the deck of an aircraft carrier. As devoutly as we wish it, such a “victory” will not happen. As with the War on Drugs and War on Poverty, this struggle against global extremism and terrorism cannot be “won,” in the classical sense. Even if bin Laden were captured and forced to sign a document, al-Qaeda and regional terrorist groups would carry on. There will be no quick fix.
Words Matter: The “War on...” formulation is one we Americans understand. Earlier administrations fought “wars” on drugs, illiteracy and poverty. The Global War on Terrorism - GWOT - is an easy short-hand. Unfortunately, much of the world hears this term negatively, as an over-militarisation of the response. The leaders of our major European allies have banned the use of the “war” term. Even former Secretary Rumsfeld recognised that we needed different terminology. One of my students recently proposed “Multilateral Coalition Against Terrorism.” That term hits some important positive notes for our allies. Useful for us Americans is that MCAT is a pronounceable acronym. Your counterterrorism experts surely can devise a better term than the GWOT.
Iraq is not the front line: You should be clear with the public that Iraq is not and was not the front line against terrorism. Saddam did aid secular terrorists, but not al-Qaeda. In fact, Saddam was the kind of secular ruler who would have been in bin Laden’s sights, sooner or later. Further, you should make clear that your administration does not subscribe to assertions that we were drawing the world’s terrorists into Iraq in order to eliminate them. This assumes that there is a finite number of terrorists to do away with. Also, it was never possible that al-Qaeda would “take over” post-Saddam Iraq. Iraqis, even the insurgents, would not turn over their country to outsiders, such as the Egyptians, Saudis and others who populate al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Pakistan is the front line: The Pakistan-Afghan border is the front line against global terrorism. Bin Laden and Zawahiri almost certainly are there, and al-Qaeda has made considerable progress in reconstituting the capabilities it lost in Afghanistan. Planning for another 9/11 or worse surely is going on there. Your administration must find a way to continue the hunt for the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan without destabilising the government in Islamabad. At the same time, it is urgent that major military and development efforts be made in Afghanistan to halt the deterioration there and suppress the Taliban to the maximum. Iraq was a huge mistake that led to the diminution of effort in Afghanistan. You must reverse it.
Not primarily a military struggle: We truly must use all instruments of national power to suppress extremists and terrorists. The previous administration over-militarised the struggle. It was seen primarily as a war and the military as the principal instrument for dealing with it around the globe. Those who understood that the struggle is primarily an intelligence and international law enforcement matter were often dismissed. Nonetheless, combating al-Qaeda and other stateless groups is more akin to fighting organised crime and the drug cartels. While the US military appropriately has the lead in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world is made up of sovereign countries where outside military forces cannot operate openly and in any significant numbers without an invitation from the government. With the US military in a strong supporting role, our diplomatic, law enforcement and intelligence assets must be the principal tools used to bolster and press other governments and their security forces. Sometimes, US individuals or very small groups may be required to achieve a particular task in a non-permissive environment, but this is not the preferred route. Remember that terrorists who kill innocents in a market or destroy commercial aircraft are criminals. They are not an army and should not be granted “warrior” or military-like status. They are criminals and must be brought to justice or eliminated.
This is not a war on Islam: Despite President Bush’s measured language and visits to mosques, the extremist media have done an impressive job of painting our fight against terrorism as an attack on Islam. As part of your dialogue with the American people and the world, you and your administration should find convincing ways to deliver the correct message. Remember that a small group of people has seized upon a few verses of the Qur’an and the writings of select scholars to justify criminal acts - mass murder, beheadings and violent attacks on the US, its friends and many Muslims.
Root causes: Be careful about “root causes” arguments. You may hear assertions that, if the US finally solved the Arab-Israeli conflict, then terrorism would dry up. This is not correct. We should exert our considerable weight in a serious, sustained and balanced effort to achieve a Middle East settlement. Such a wonderful outcome should take a good bit of the rhetorical heat out of condemnations of the United States, but bin Laden’s “concern” for the Palestinians is more recent. For many years, he was focused on the Saudi royal family and then on the US and Saudi Arabia. There is no prospect that a Middle East settlement would lead al-Qaeda to stop targeting the US and its friends.
Losing the “War of Ideas:” The quick and decisive military victories in Afghanistan in 2001-02 and Iraq in 2003 were what the world expected from us. Therefore, people around the world have been amazed at how badly we have fared against Islamist media efforts, particularly against Zawahiri and al-Qaeda’s al-Sahab production unit. This is not primarily a matter of moving the public diplomacy boxes around or reconstituting the US Information Agency. We certainly can improve in that area, and your administration should take a close look at what is optimal. Further, there is much that can be done quietly to make it more difficult for al-Sahab and others to spew out hatred and lies. It is essential, however, that we not give terrorists unnecessary openings by using inflammatory language or by being seen as indifferent or hopelessly biased on issues of importance within the larger Islamic world, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Al-Qaeda’s slaughter of fellow Muslims in Iraq, Jordan and elsewhere has begun to turn the tide against the organisation, but your administration can speed up this welcome trend. Again, there are balanced experts in and outside of government who understand how to deal with and reverse current negative media trends.
Repairing our image: Reversing the catastrophic decline in the US global image is a matter of national security. This is not just a question of needing to be liked or regaining the status of “Shining City on the Hill.” We are the principal target for al-Qaeda and an important target for regional terrorist groups. Therefore, we must be able to exercise global leadership on the MCAT (or whatever you choose to call it). It is clear that we cannot find and disrupt every terrorist cell in every country in the world. It is up to the local governments and security forces to do so. This is more than just a matter of ineptitude in public diplomacy. This is primarily actions-based and is related to our policies. If our own actions, such as Guantanamo, torture and domestic spying, make it difficult for other governments and security forces to work with us in rooting out those cells, that is a major negative for us. We cannot suppress global terrorism on our own.
Undermining our values: “Burning down the village to save it” is wrong and makes no sense. Among the many things that made the US great and a beacon to the world was our commitment to the Constitution, civil liberties and the rule of law. Remember that al-Qaeda cannot destroy or change the US. Only we can change our country, and we have taken steps in that regard that have been public relations gifts to bin Laden. You must urgently return all elements of our government to adherence to law and basic norms. You should outlaw torture, stop wiretapping not approved by the FISA court, close Guantanamo and abolish military tribunals. You have seen the newspaper reports that a CIA study determined that some one-third of Guantanamo detainees were there by mistake. A senior US military officer judged the percentage to be higher. Alleged criminals must be brought into the civil legal system, or at least some version of it. Surely, our best legal minds can find a fix for presenting sensitive evidence in a civil court. One proposal was the creation of a special National Security Court, where the judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys all have security clearances. We may not be able to regain “Shining City” status during one administration, but we can return to being true to our own constitution and values. It is right for our country. Our partners and friends abroad will welcome it, as well.
Reflections on the Mumbai attacks
U.S. Policy: The attack should end once and for all any lingering assertions (if there have been any since January 20) that Iraq is the front line in the global struggle against terrorism and extremism. It isn’t now and never was. Afghanistan was and still is very dangerous, but Pakistan is THE front line in the global fight. Even if the government and army somehow manage to beat back the extremists inside the heart of Pakistan, it is hard to see how they will be able to dislodge al-Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban from the border region. While they may not have quite as extensive training and planning facilities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as they had in Afghanistan, the terrorists have a good bit of space to operate. I have no doubt that major attacks against the U.S. and Europe are being planned right now in those areas.
President Obama and the U.S. administration should continue reaching out to the Islamic world and should build and emphasize “soft power” and much more skillful public diplomacy. That said, the U.S. must take a firm line with the “irreconcilables,” including al-Qaeda and most of the Taliban. In my view, we need to keep great pressure on the terrorists along the Af-Pak border, including kinetic action that is as carefully honed as possible. There are downsides, but another 9/11-level attack launched from the FATA region would have terrible consequences all around.
EU Policy: It is easy for an American to say, but Europe should significantly step up the fight against global terrorism across the board – troops in action in dangerous places; military training, development assistance, public diplomacy, etc. Mumbai reminds everyone that terrorist attack planning continues, regardless of the world economy and of the leaders who come and go in the West. Just as I am sure that attacks against the U.S are being hatched in Pakistan, I am equally certain that European targets are getting their share of terrorist brain power.
mercredi 13 mai 2009
Nouvelle Publication: Engager l'OCS en Afghanistan
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Dans le numéro de DSI de ce mois de mai, vous pourrez trouver un article de votre serviteur consacré au narcotrafic en Afghanistan, mais aussi le long des "routes de l'opium", et au rôle possible que peut jouer l'Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai dans cette lutte contre le trafic de drogue qui a d'importantes répercussions sur la sécurité en Afghanistan (lien narcotrafic-insurrection), en Asie (poches d'instabilités en Asie Centrale) et en Europe (problème de santé publique).
En-tête de l'article:Dans le cadre de la lutte contre la production illégale d’opium en Afghanistan, les débats se limitent trop souvent au problème de la culture et de son éradication. Or, le trafic de drogue crée aussi des poches d’instabilité tout le long des « routes de l’opium ». Dès lors, il est intéressant de se pencher sur le possible rôle de l’Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai (OCS) dans la lutte contre le narcotrafic et sur les conséquences d’une telle collaboration OTAN-OCS.
lundi 11 mai 2009
Nouvelle Publication: AfPak et Terrorisme en Europe
Suite à la publication du rapport annuel d'Europol dont j'ai déjà fait écho dans ce blog, je viens également de publier un article dans Terrorism Monitor (nouveau format et nouveau rythme pour cette publication de référence dans le domaine) qui tente d'ébaucher le lien existant entre la menace terroriste en Europe, et l'AfPak. Plus exactement, je souligne le fossé qui peut exister entre la vision américaine ou britannique des opérations en Afghanistan (être là-bas pour assurer notre sécurité ici) et la vision européenne (présence en Afghanistan minimale par simple solidarité atlantiste).
Europol Report Describes Afghanistan-Pakistan Connection to Trends in European Terrorism
By: Thomas Renard
Terrorist activities within the European Union (EU) declined in 2008 as compared to the previous year, according to the annual report published by Europol, the European Union’s criminal intelligence agency. [1] The report lists 515 failed, foiled or successful attacks reported by EU member states, a decrease from 583 attacks in 2007 but still higher than the 2006 total. The decline in terrorist activities was also observed geographically, with only seven member states reporting attacks, two less than in 2007 and four less than in 2006. There were 1009 individuals arrested last year in relation to terrorism activities, a several percent decline in comparison to 2007. Nevertheless, despite an undisputable decline, the threat of terrorism to the EU “remains high,” according to Europol deputy director Mariano Simancas (AFP, April 17).
The Varieties of Terrorism
The terrorist threat to Europe encompasses many different forms of terrorism, from left-wing to right-wing extremism, jihadi activities, ethno-separatism, and single issue terrorism. Each form of political violence saw a decline in 2008, with the notable exception of left-wing terrorism, which increased by 25 percent. Left-wing and anarchist extremists remained operational in Greece, Spain and Italy. In addition, French intelligence warned of a “resurgence” of left-wing terrorism which was confirmed by 37 arrests in 2008, significantly more than in any other European country over the last three years (Nouvel Observateur, November 25, 2008).
Separatist terrorists remained by far the most active in Europe. They carried out a total of 397 attacks in 2008, of which 98 percent took place in France and Spain, causing the deaths of four people. The number of attacks decreased by 25 percent in comparison to 2007, mainly due to a relative lull in activity by the Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica (FLNC). In Spain, the Basque separatist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) is thought to be encountering difficulties. The group was weakened by the arrests of three successive military leaders in the last six months, the latest being the arrest of Jurdan Martitegi (El País [Madrid], April 18). The Europol report notes that the growing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the ETA, a trend that started in 2007, indicates that it is “encountering increasing difficulties in the acquisition of commercial explosives.”
The Islamist Threat to Europe
In most European countries, however, Islamist terrorism continues to be seen as the biggest threat to security because it attempts to cause mass casualties whereas ethno-separatist terrorism generally targets material symbols rather than individuals or groups. EU counter-terrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove recently said; “The [European] intelligence community considers that the al-Qaeda related threat is still severe and that it is still the main threat to Europe and its internal security” (EuroparlTV, February 2).
There was only one attack in Europe attributable to Islamist terrorism in 2008, when 22-year old Muslim convert Nicky Reilly attempted to detonate a homemade bomb in a shopping mall restaurant in Exeter, South-West England, but injured only himself. Reilly is mentally ill and highly vulnerable. He apparently self-radicalized through the internet, although he had also been in contact with radical Muslims. He was jailed for life in January 2009 (Times, January 31).
In 2008, excluding the United Kingdom, 187 individuals were arrested on suspicion of involvement in Islamist terrorism, mainly in France and Spain. [2] This represents a decrease of 7 percent as compared to 2007, and an even greater decrease as compared to 2006. This continuous decrease in the number of arrests seems to indicate a relative diminution of jihadi activities in Europe, although including statistics from the UK would likely lead to a slightly less optimistic conclusion. The number of member states which reported arrests related to Islamist terrorism also decreased from 14 in 2007 to 10 in 2008. The majority of these arrested individuals came from North African countries.
For its part, the UK indicated to Europol that it arrested 256 people in relation to terrorism without providing specific details relative to the distribution of these arrests among the different forms of terrorism. However, given the level of jihadi activism in Great Britain, it can be assumed that a significant share of these arrests was related to Islamist terrorism. The 256 arrests in the UK was an increase in comparison to 2007 (201) and 2006 (156).
Two thirds of arrested individuals could not be linked to organizations known by the authorities and belonged instead to small autonomous cells. This fact seems to confirm the growing threat of self-radicalization and homegrown terrorism that Europe is facing. Part of the explanation for this shift in the radicalization pattern lies in the increasing quantity and quality of Islamist propaganda in Europe. Indeed, there is an increasing number of radical Islamist websites and forums in European languages indicating, according to Europol, an expansion of jihadi propaganda efforts to reach specific audiences. This phenomenon has been observed in Germany, for instance, with messages and videos, including calls for attacks and instructions for the building of bombs, posted directly in German or in Arabic with German subtitles (see Terrorism Focus, February 20, 2008).
Terrorist Recruitment in Europe
In its report, Europol states that “Islamist recruitment activities have largely been driven underground. Radicalization activities are noted to have moved from mosques and other public places into private spaces.” Jihadi forums constitute the archetype of such “underground” and “private spaces”. The internet can also be used as a resource-tool for jihadi training, as in the case of Britain’s Nicky Reilly.
Nevertheless, the internet has not yet replaced real-life interactions regarding radicalization, recruitment and military training, but should rather be seen as a complement or a substitute. A very good illustration of this was provided by the December 11, 2008 arrests in Belgium. [3] While some members of the cell entered into contact with Malika el-Aroud (the wife of the cell’s leader, Moez Garsallaoui), through her French-language jihadi website, “SOS Minbar,” Garsallaoui was recruiting young Muslims in person in the streets and mosques of Brussels. Through the website, a “dialogue” was established with some subscribers which could lead to a meeting with Garsallaoui. Once recruited, members were sent to the tribal areas in Pakistan, where they received religious and military training, followed by a “jihadi exposure,” i.e. following fighters to the warzone without having the authorization to take part in the fight. Eventually, members of the cell were ordered to return to Belgium to establish a sleeper cell.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan Connection
The Belgian cell illustrates another major problem, which is the connection between the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and the terrorist threat in Europe. Indeed, as the report states, “Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to have replaced Iraq as preferred destinations for volunteers wishing to engage in armed conflicts.” These recruits pose a threat to European troops deployed in Afghanistan. Germany, for instance, is particularly worried about the presence of several of its citizens (most notably Eric Breininger) in the region who are allegedly plotting operations against German troops (see Terrorism Focus, January 28).
When fighters return – such as members of the Belgian cell, or members of the Sauerland cell in Germany – they pose a direct threat to European security. As expressed by U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, “the primary threat from Europe-based extremists stems from al-Qaeda and Sunni affiliates who return from training in Pakistan to conduct attacks in Europe or the United States.” [4]
Although most European countries recognize that Afghanistan and Pakistan constitute a threat to their security, they generally tend to see the military operations in Afghanistan more as a part of the problem than as a part of the solution. Mirroring this point of view, the Europol report states that “a number of member states judge that they continue to face a high-level threat from Islamist terrorism for reasons that include [a] military presence in Iraq or Afghanistan,” but nowhere does the report mention the fact that European military and civilian missions in conflict zones could help strengthen EU homeland security.
Last month, however, the European Commission, the executive branch of the EU, announced a new three-year, €225 million program aimed at combating terrorism and the trafficking of WMDs (AFP, April 17). This program will focus on Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are described as “bases for radicalization and terrorist training,” as well as the Sahel region where the threat is “growing”. In both regions, the program proposes to support the establishment of anti-terrorism structures, the formation of competent authorities, and the development of regional cooperation. Nevertheless, with only a few details of the plan available, it is not yet possible to assess whether this program inextricably links stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region with European security, or whether it is more a program destined to compensate for European lack of commitment to the mission or prepare for a future disengagement from Afghanistan.
Conclusion
The terrorist threat in Europe remains high, although statistics show a certain decline in terrorist activities. One should be careful, however, when interpreting these statistics because the lack of details from the UK data could be misleading and also because the year 2007 saw a dramatic increase in terrorist activities, meaning that last year’s decline could merely be a return to “normality.” Although separatist terrorism is statistically much more significant, Islamist terrorists are still seen as the biggest threat to Europe given that most of their plots involve mass-killings. Today’s threat is tightly related to the situation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Nevertheless, most EU member states believe their presence in Afghanistan is more a cause of terrorism in Europe than a remedy for it.
Notes:
1. “TE-SAT 2009 – EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report”, Europol, April 2009.
2. The statistics given to Europol by the UK contained for the first time numbers from Northern Ireland and are therefore not comparable with previous years. Moreover, the UK sends only one global number for attacks and arrests, but does not provide the specific distribution among the different forms of terrorism, rendering it harder to draw conclusions based on statistics.
3. Paul Cruickshank, “The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline,” CTC Sentinel, April 2009.
4. Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2009.
Lien vers l'article paru dans Terrorism Monitor le 8 mai 2009.
mercredi 6 mai 2009
Quand les Médias se montrent Complices
Ce matin, en allumant ma radio, j'entend les journalistes de La Première, la radio nationale belge, annoncer à grands coups de fanfare une "interview exclusive avec un proche du Mollah Omar", à savoir le Taliban Sirajuddin Haqqani, fils du célèbre combattant Jalaluddin Haqqani.
A priori, comme exprimé dans la citation en-tête de ce blog, je ne suis pas contre les entretiens avec les leaders jihadistes, Taliban et autres. En effet, cela permet souvent d'en apprendre un peu plus sur eux, leurs objectifs, leurs perspectives, etc.
Le problème tient en fait, selon moi, à la manière de présenter les choses et de les mettre en forme. D'une part, assez avec ces "exclusifs"! La Première n'est ni la première (c'est le cas de la dire) ni la dernière à obtenir une interview avec des leaders Taliban (pensons à Paris-Match qui avait photographié les Taliban après la mort des 10 soldats français). Il n'y en fait que peu d'exclusivité dans cette démarche de relations publiques des Taliban! Car il s'agit bien de cela. Lorsque Haqqani se vante que des milliers d'Afghans et de Pakistanais cherchent à joindre ses rangs chaque jour, qu'il ne sait où donner de la tête et qu'il est obligé de refuser des candidatures, on est en pleine opération de démoralisation de l'ennemi (en l'occurence, nous, occidentaux mais surtout Belges). Les journalistes de La Première ne sont-ils donc pas capable de s'en rendre compte? De tels propos visent sans aucun doute à démoraliser les troupes belges en Afghanistan, mais aussi l'opinion publique belge qui à son tour peut faire pression sur le gouvernement pour rapatrier nos soldats.
D'autre part, La Première n'a même pas pris la peine de donner un contre-poids aux affirmations de Haqqani. Nous n'avons eu droit qu'à sa version des faits. Aucun spécialiste pour rappeler qu'al-Qaïda a subit de lourdes pertes ces derniers mois et souffre d'une certaine désorganisation. Personne pour dire que les frappes aériennes des drones de la CIA au Pakistan déstabilisent complètement et font peur à al-Qaïda et aux Taliban. Pas un expert pour expliquer que si les Taliban pakistanais ont certes l'initiative en ce moment, la situation des Taliban afghans n'est pas aussi bonne, sans être mauvaise non plus bien sûr (après tout, Haqqani est obligé d'opérer à partir d'un autre pays que le sien, le Pakistan, ce qui n'est tout de même pas un signe d'initiative absolue, même si l'on sait que le fait qu'ils opèrent à partir du Pakistan pose de gros problèmes aux forces de l'Alliance).
Quand les journalistes vendent la propagande "ennemie" sur nos ondes, il y a selon moi un problème éthique remarquable. Surtout lorsque cette propagande coule au travers du robinet ouvert de l'information, jusque dans nos oreilles, sans la mise en place du moindre filtre protecteur.
mardi 5 mai 2009
Djihad sur fond de Hip-Hop
Al-Shabaab, la branche somalienne d'al-Qaïda, a produit une nouvelle vidéo qui met en scène Abou Mansoor al-Amriki, un djihadiste américain qui a rejoint le groupe en Afrique. La particularité de cette vidéo est qu'elle met en scène le jeune homme sur une musique aux tonalités "hip-hop". Or, comme souligné dans l'article par un membre d'IntelCenter, il s'agit d'une chose assez unique pour être soulignée et reflète l'un des plus clairs efforts d'al-Qaïda pour toucher une cible très spécifique, en l'occurence la jeunesse américaine.
On remarque depuis près de deux ans maintenant un véritable effort des djihadistes pour toucher des audiences précises, notamment avec la multiplication des sites internet et forums dans des langues européennes, traduisant une plus grande quantité et qualité de la propagande djihadiste. Europol fait le même constat dans son dernier rapport.
Par ailleurs, le lien entre rap et djihad n'est pas neuf. J'en avais déjà parlé ici.
lundi 4 mai 2009
Madrassas et Terrorisme au Pakistan
Le New York Times revient ce matin sur la prolifération des madrassas (écoles coraniques) au Pakistan, et plus particulièrement au Penjab. Peu de choses nouvelles dans cet article, mais cela vaut quand même de souligner (une fois de plus) que le problème de la violence et de la radicalisation n'est pas tant lié à la pauvreté qu'à la non gouvernance. Voici l'extrait le plus intéressant:But if the state has forgotten the children here, the mullahs have not. With public education in a shambles, Pakistan’s poorest families have turned to madrasas, or Islamic schools, that feed and house the children while pushing a more militant brand of Islam than was traditional here.
Les familles dans cette région ont toujours été pauvres, mais les madrassas n'étaient pas aussi populaires et ne le sont que parce que les autorités étatiques sont totalement absentes.
L'article fait ensuite le lien entre madrassas et terrorisme. J'ai toujours été assez prudent sur les connexions trop directes entre ces deux éléments. En effet, les terroristes ne viennent pas toujours d'une éducation islamiste radicale dès l'enfance. Bien sûr, la socialisation joue un rôle très important, comme souligné de nombreuses fois dans ce blog. Mais il n'y a à cet égard pas de déterminisme. Islamisme radical n'est pas terrorisme. Et le terrorisme (même islamiste) n'a pas forcément besoin d'une structure d'éducation radicale. Le terrorisme repose en fait plutôt sur des structures informelles.
Ayant dit tout cela, et sachant qu'il existe des études statistiques montrant l'absence de lien entre terrorisme et madrassas, je suis tout de même frappé par le constat suivant, fait par la police pakistanaise:
In an analysis of the profiles of suicide bombers who have struck in Punjab, the Punjab police said more than two-thirds had attended madrasas.
